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INFORMAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE: NOTICE AND DUE PROCESS
by Roger A. Manlin* and Richard A. Martens**
I. Introduction
On August 7, 1969, the Uniform Probate Code was formally
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. The Code, which now goes to the state legisla-
tures for debate and possible enactment, contemplates a speedy
and efficient system of settling a decedent's estate' by providing
interested persons 2 with alternative methods of securing both
probate of a will and the appointment of a personal representa-
tive.
Lord Brougham, speaking in the 19th century, expressed dis-
satisfaction with the probate procedures of his era when he said,
"A lawyer is a learned gentleman who rescues your estate from
your enemies and keeps it himself." 3 In more recent times numer-
ous authors emphasizing the need for modernization and for revi-
sion of existing probate procedures have repeated Lord Broug-
ham's sentiment before a receptive public. 4
* Mr. Manlin is a member of the staff of Prospectus.
** Mr. Martens is a member of the Editorial Board of Prospectus.
1 This procedure includes settlement of any question concerning testacy, the proving of a
will, and the appointment of a personal representative to distribute the estate and to
satisfy creditors' claims.
2 U.P.C. § 1-201
"Interested persons includes heirs, devisees, children,
spouses, creditors, beneficiaries and any others having a
property right in or claim against a trust estate or the
estate of a decedent, ward or protected person which
may be affected by the proceeding. It also includes per-
sons having priority for appointment as personal repre-
sentative, and other fiduciaries representing interested
persons. The meaning as it relates to particular persons
may vary from time to time and must be determined
according to the particular purposes of, and matter in-
volved in, any proceeding.
3 Henry, Peter, Lord Brougham [ 1778-1868].4 Seefor example, Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 183
(1940); N. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE, (1965); Let's Rewrite the Probate
Laws, CHANGING TIMES, (Jan. 1969), at 39; Bloom, The Mess in Our Probate
Courts, 89 READERS DIGEST, 202 (Oct. 1966).
39
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In the late 1920's the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws attempted to improve the procedures
regarding probate and contest of wills. 5 In 1933, however, the
committee appointed by the National Conference to study the
problem reported that it was impossible to secure any uniformity
concerning the probate of wills, and the effort was accordingly
abandoned. On January 1, 1946 the Model Probate Code was
published under the auspices of the Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association. The
provisions of the Model Probate Code have been accepted or
rejected by the state legislatures in varying degrees. Indeed, the
Model Probate Code was not presented as a uniform act but
rather as "a reservoir of ideas ... from which legislative com-
mittees may draw the framework of new probate codes." 6 The
erratic adoption and rejection of the Model Probate Code's provi-
sions coupled with the confusion of lawyers and of the general
public caused by the dissimilarity in probate law and practice
gave impetus to a further attempt at unification. 7 The Uniform
Probate Code is the culmination of an effort initiated in 1962
under the joint sponsorship of the National Conference on Uni-
form State Laws and a special committee of the Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association.
At the heart of the Uniform Probate Code's system are the
informal proceedingsS which permit settlement, with varying de-
grees of finality, of all sizes of estates without delay or adjudica-
tion.9 By allowing persons to settle an estate promptly after the
decedent's death by application to an officer of the court, the
Code permits the successors of a decedent to settle their affairs
concerning the estate without the constant scrutiny of the judicial
machinery. This is consistent with the proposition accepted by
the drafters of the Code that the probate court's proper role is to
be readily available to aid in the settlement of an estate when
such aid is requested rather than to impose its unsolicited super-
5 Levy, Probate in Common Form in the United States: The Problem of Notice in Probate
Proceedings, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 420, 430 (1952).
6 SIMES & BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE, 10
(1946).
7 Administrative Portions of Draft Uniform Probate Code-A n Appraisal, 2 REAL PROPER-
TY, PROBATE & TRUST J. No. 3 (Fall, 1967) at 273.
8 U.P.C. §§ 3-301 to 311.
9 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, at xxxiii (Working Draft No. 5).
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vision to see that otherwise non-contentious settlements are for-
mally correct.' 0
The Code's formal procedures, which require that notice be
mailed or be personally delivered to interested parties prior to any
formal proceeding, seem to offer little difficulty in terms of due
process. However, the Code's informal procedures, insofar as
they encompass no-notice proceedings, have suffered some criti-
cism." It is the purpose of this article to respond to these criti-
cisms, and to demonstrate that the informal procedures of the
Code as accepted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws do in fact offer all interested persons
adequate protection of their interests in an estate and are fully
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's standards of
fairness and due process of law.
II. Informal Proceedings Under the
Uniform Probate Code
A. Informal Procedure
Under the Uniform Probate Code, an interested person may
choose either informal or formal procedures for each step in the
settlement of an estate.' 2
Informal proceedings are administrative rather than judicial in
character, 13 and may be completed without any notice having
been given except to those persons who file a demand for notice
with the court and to any personal representative of the decedent
whose appointment has not been terminated. 14 Application for
informal probate is made by submitting to the Registrar 15 a de-
tailed statement, made under oath before a public official, that the
10 Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance, 44
IND. L. J. 191, 199 (1969).
11 Seefor example, Comment, 53 IOWA L. REV. 508.
12 U.PC. §§ 3-102, 3-105.
13 U.P.C. § 3-302 and Comment.
14See U.P.C. §§ 3-306, 3-3 10.
15 The "Registrar" is either a judge of the court or a person, including the clerk, designated
by a written order filed and recorded in the office of the court. U.P.C. §§ 1-201 (ii),
1-307.
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will is entitled to the advantages of the informal procedures. 16
Upon findings by the Registrar that the application is complete
and that the applicant has sworn that the statements contained
therein are true to the best of his knowledge and belief,17 a
written statement of informal probate will be issued.18 It 'is pro-
vided, however, that if for any reason the Registrar is not satisfied
that a will is entitled to be probated in informal proceedings, he
may decline the application. 19
The appointment of a personal representative, which is neces-
sary to commence the administration of an estate,20 may be ac-
complished through informal or formal procedures. This is the
case whether the decedent died testate or intestate, and whether
no proceedings (intestacy), informal proceedings (will) or formal
testacy proceedings (either) have been used to identify probable
successors. 21 If the interested party seeking administration elects
16 Included in the application for informal probate of a will or for informal appointment of a
personal representative are: 1) a statement of the interest of the applicant; 2) names
and addresses of all heirs and devisees of the decedent so far as ascertainable with
reasonable diligence by the applicant; 3) the name and address of any personal
representative of the decedent whose appointment has not been terminated; 4) a
statement indicating whether the applicant has received a demand for notice or is
aware of any uch demand; 5) that the original of the decedent's last will is in the
possession of the court; 6) that the applicant, to the best of his knowledge, believes
the will to be valid and that after the exercise of reasonable diligence the applicant is
unaware of any instrument revoking the will. U.P.C. § 3-301.
17 In addition, the Registrar shall determine that 1) the applicant is an interested person; 2)
that venue is proper; 3) that an original, duly executed and unrevoked will is in the
Registrar's possession; 4) that notice has been given to any persons who have
demanded notice; and 5) that the time limit for original probate has not expired.
U.P.C. § 3-303.
18 U.P.C. § 3-302.
19 Although the refusal of informal probate cannot be appealed, the proponent may initiate
a formal proceeding and put the matter before a judge. U.P.C. § 3-305 and Comment.
20 U.P.C. § 3-103.
21 A "testacy proceeding" is a proceeding to establish a will or to determine intestacy.
U.P.C. § 1-201 (qq). If the decedent is assumed to have died intestate, the heirs at
law may, if they choose, simply seek appointment of a personal representative to
administer the estate without seeking a testacy proceeding. If, after three years, no
will has been offered for probate, the assumption of intestacy becomes conclusive.
U.P.C. § 3-108 and Comment. If, on the other hand, the decedent died testate, it
becomes necessary to have the will admitted to probate by either formal or informal
procedures. U.P.C. § 3-102. After the will has been admitted to probate, a personal
representative must be appointed to commence administration. U.P.C. § 3-103. How-
ever, upon the petition of an interested person a formal testacy proceeding may be
commenced which requests the court, after notice and hearing, to determine whether
a decedent left a valid will, to enter an order probating a will, to prevent or set aside
an informal probate of a will, or for a determination that the decedent died intestate.
U.P.C. § 3-401. Whatever the order of the formal testacy proceeding, a personal
representative must be appointed to distribute the estate. U.P.C. §§ 3-103, 3-401 and
Comment.
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to apply for informal appointment 22 of a personal representative,
the Registrar possesses the same power to accept or decline the
application for informal appointment 23 as in the informal probate
proceedings. Upon appointment, however, the personal represen-
tative must make his appointment known to all persons who
appear to have an interest in the estate, including those who
appear to be disinherited by the assumption concerning testacy
under which the personal representative was appointed. 24 This
would include the heirs at law of a decedent whose will was being
informally probated. In addition, the personal representative
must, upon his appointment, publish a notice in a newspaper of
general circulation once a week for three successive weeks, no-
tifying creditors of the estate to present their claims within four
months or be forever barred.25
For the protection of heirs who are not also devisees of a
decedent, and for the protection of devisees of an undiscovered
will, the Code provides for a period of one year after informal
probate or three years after death of the decedent, whichever
occurs later, in which any interested person may contest the will
or invoke the power of the court and initiate formal proceed-
ings. 26 As a consequence, a will formally probated becomes con-
clusive three years after the date of death or one year from
informal probate, if later.27 The order of a formal proceeding,
however, can be vacated only upon appeal, or for one of the
following reasons: (1) the offer of a later discovered will of the
decedent only if it is shown that the proponents of the later
discovered will were unaware of its existence at the time of the
earlier formal proceeding in spite of the exercise of reasonable
diligence in efforts to locate any will, or were unaware of the
earlier proceeding and were given no notice thereof; (2) if in-
testacy has been ordered, the determination of heirs may be
22 U.P.C. § 3-308.
U.P.C. § 3-309.24 The information concerning the representative's appointment is not to be confused with
the notice requirements of formal proceedings. The communication is to be delivered
or sent by ordinary mail only to those whose addresses are reasonably available to.
the personal representative. Furthermore, no notice is required if no personal repre-
sentative is appointed. U.P.C. § 3-705 and Comment.
2 U.P.C. § 3-80 1.
26 U.P.C. § 3-108 and Comment.
2 7 Id.
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reconsidered if it is shown that a person was unaware of his
relationship to the decedent or was unaware of any proceeding
concerning his estate; (3) a vacation of the order may be made
upon the discovery that the alleged decedent is alive; and (4) for
good cause shown.28
B. Formal Procedure
Formal procedures are judical rather than administrative in
character; that is, they are procedures conducted before a judge
after notice to interested persons. 29 If formal procedures are
selected to settle the question of whether the decedent left a will,
notice must be given to certain interested persons by mail or by
personal service prior to the hearing concerning testacy.30 Sim-
ilarly, if formal appointment proceedings are requested after a
formal or informal determination of the testacy question, notice
by mail or by personal service must be given to interested parties
prior to the hearing upon a petition for appointment.3' The Code,
however, permits "formal testacy" proceedings requiring notice
to all interested persons to occur before, after or without appoint-
ment of a personal representative.32 Moreover, appointment pro-
ceedings may be without notice to all interested persons, that is,
be informal, even though the testacy question is handled in a
formal proceeding.33 This flexibility allows interested persons to
employ informal proceedings in uncontested matters while always
providing access to judicial determination of matters in need of
28 U.P.C. §§ 3-412, 3-413.
29 U.P.C. § 1-201(o).
30 Upon commencement of either a formal testacy proceeding or a formal appointment
proceeding, notice shall be given by mail or by personal service to the surviving
spouse, children and other heirs of the decedent, the devisees and executors named in
any will that is being, or has been probated, and any personal representative whose
appointment has not been terminated. In addition, notice shall be given by publica-
tion. U.P.C. §§ 3-403, 1-401.
After notice to interested persons including all persons
interested in the administration of the estate as succes-
sors under the applicable assumption concerning testacy,
any previously appointed personal representative and
any person having or claiming priority for appointment
as personal representative, the court shall determine who
is entitled to appointment.... U.P.C. § 3-414.
31 U.P.C. § 3-403.
32 U.P.C. § 3-414, Comment.
3 U.P.C. §§ 3-414, Comment, 3-107, 3-30 1(c)(d), 3-307.
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resolution. 34 In addition, any interested party may petition the
Court at any time for supervised administration which is a single
proceeding to secure the complete administration and settlement
of a decedent's estate under the continuing authority of the
court.35 Such supervised administration requires notice to all in-
terested parties by mail or by personal service when judicial
control is instituted3 6 and again when the final order is entered.3 7
C. Flexibility of the U.P.C.: An Illustration
Most testators desire that their estate pass to the named de-
visees as smoothly and as quickly as possible with minimal court
interference.3 8 The Code satisfies this desire by establishing a
broad range of alternative procedures which facilitate the efficient
disposition of estates.3 9 At the same time, the Code provides all
interested persons with easy access to a court in which any
problems that arise may be quickly and efficiently resolved. 40
The flexibility of the Code may be easily illustrated. Assume
that the testator dies survived by his wife, one adult daughter and
two adult sons. An apparently well executed will leaves three
fourths of his estate to his widow and the balance to his daughter.
His sons want nothing and everyone is willing to cooperate. One
possible approach to settlement of the estate would be the in-
itiation of informal probate proceedings followed by informal ap-
pointment proceedings. After such proceedings the executor need
only pay all known bills and have the estate distributed to the
widow and daughter. This choice of procedure is fast and in-
34 U.P.C. § 3-414, Comment. Article IIl Introduction.
35 U.P.C. § 3-501.
36 U.P.C. §§ 3-106, 3-502.
37 U.P.C. §§ 3-505, Comment, 1-401.
38 See Administrative Portions of Draft Uniform Probate Code-An Appraisal, 2 REAL
PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J., No. 3 at 274 (Fall, 1967).
39 "Hopefully efficient and inexpensive procedures will be used to handle even substantial
estates if there does not appear to be any reasonable likelihood of controversy."
Wellman, The Proposed Uniform Probate Code, 107 TRUSTS AND ESTATES, 238, 241
(March, 1968). See in this connection, note 12 supra; and "Flexible System for
Administering Decedents' Estates," U.P.C. Table V. at xxvii et seq. (Working Draft
No. 5) for illustrations of how different combinations of formal and informal proceed-
ings may be employed in the handling of an estate depending on the circumstances
surrounding the estate and the desires of interested persons; and 2 REAL PROPERTY.
PROBATE & TRUST JOURNAL, No. 3, 273, 278 (Fall, 1967).
4o U.P.C. § 3-703.
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expensive. It is, however, very risky. Since the informally pro-
bated will remains subject to challenge for a period of three years
from death, there remains the possibility of a will contest by any
interested person, the discovery of another will, or claims of a
prior spouse or forgotten children who may unexpectedly appear.
Moreover, if the claim of the spouse or children involves a home-
stead allowance 41 or exempt property, 42 it may not be cut off even
after the three year period.
Employing informal probate and informal appointment proce-
dures to distribute the estate, and employing formal probate
procedures after administration to ensure protection against sub-
sequent challenges to the testacy status of the decedent would
seem to provide a safer approach. If an interested person desires
to seal off any questions that might arise between the representa-
tive and the distributees, or among the distributees, formal pro-
ceedings may be instituted by petitioning the court for an order
construing the will and adjudicating final settlement and dis-
tribution of the estate.43 This order, however, if sought under an
informally probated will, will not adjudicate the testacy status of
the decedent. 44 The testacy status, having been determined in an
informal proceeding, remains subject to attack for three years,
and accordingly, the settlement and distribution of the estate may
be overturned. If full protection is desired, the formal adjudica-
tion of settlement and distribution may be coupled with a formal
probate proceeding to establish the will. Regardless of which
procedure or combinations of procedures is used, the choice is
controlled privately by the persons interested in the estate and is
dependent upon the degree of protection thought necessary or
desirable.
III. Informal Proceedings: Protection of Interested Persons
In deciding which of the alternative procedures to use in set-
41 U.P.C. § 2-401 entitles the spouse, or, if there is no spouse, the dependent children, to a
homestead allowance of $5,000 in addition to any share passing to the surviving
spouse or minor children by will, by intestate succession or by way of elective share.
42 U.P.C. § 2-402 entitles the surviving spouse, and if there is no spouse, the children, to a
portion of the estate the value of which does not exceed $3,500 in addition to any
benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse or children by will, by intestate
succession, or by way of elective share of homestead allowance.
43 1.P.C. § 3-1002.
4Id.
[Vol. 3: 1
Uniform Probate Code
tling an estate, the individual's own self interest will be the deter-
mining factor.45 Informal procedures would be most suitable for
matters which are reasonably free of doubt and present little risk
of future contention. On the other hand, the existence of a three
year period in which all matters settled informally may be chal-
lenged 46 would encourage the use of formal procedures in han-
dling matters which are uncertain or which run a risk of possible
contention.
Although there is a possibility that a real heir may be dis-
inherited via informal probate, the Code has made the risk toler-
able by procedural and natural safeguards. First, the extended
period during which an informally probated will remains in-
conclusive significantly decreases the risk of disinheritance. 47
During this period any interested party, which includes heirs who
would take in intestacy, may initiate formal proceedings to chal-
lenge the will. If it is found that administration has resulted in an
improper distribution of the decedent's estate by either dis-
tribution under an invalid will, distribution under the mistaken
belief that the decedent died intestate or distribution under an
improper appointment, a distributee is liable to return the proper-
ty improperly received as well as income from the date of dis-
tribution. 48 If the distributee does not possess the property, he is
liable for the value of the property and its income and any gain
realized therefrom. 49
Second, an heir is likely to receive the natural notice provided
by death. It has been argued that the mobility of present day
society and the breakdown of traditional family ties have reduced
the probability that interested persons will receive actual notice of
death.50 Even with present day mobility, however, it seems rare
indeed that an individual would fail to learn of the death of a
spouse, parent or other close relative within three years.
4 U.P.C. § 3-501, Comment.
46 One exception is the protection provided by the Code to a bona fide purchaser for value
without actual knowledge of any impropriety in a previous informal proceeding or
distribution who has purchased assets directly from the personal representative or
from a distributee who has received a deed of distribution from the personal represen-
tative. U.P.C. §§ 3-703(b), 3-714, 3-910.
17 Note 26 supra, and accompanying text.
48 U.P.C. § 3-909.
"s U.P.C. §§ 3-909 and Comment, 3-1006.
50 Note 11 supra at 514.
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Third, potentially interested persons are further protected by
the requirement that every will offered for informal probate be
checked by the Registrar to determine whether the will meets
certain conditions set forth in a statutory list.5 1 The Registrar may
decline the application for informal probate of any will which he
feels is not entitled to such informal proceedings. 52 Thus, any will
of doubtful validity would be forced into formal probate.
Fourth, the Code provides that, upon appointment, every per-
sonal representative give notification of his appointment to all
heirs and devisees whose addresses are reasonably available.5 3
As a result, if a personal representative were appointed, infor-
mation concerning the estate proceedings would be sent to all
heirs who might take in intestacy. There remains the risk that an
heir may not receive notice in those cases in which an interested
party has sought informal probate of a will without requesting
appointment of a personal representative. However, the possible
ill effects of such a situation are significantly decreased by provi-
sions of the Code allowing a spouse or creditor to file a claim
against the estate for several months after publication of notice to
creditors. 54 Since publication of notice to creditors is part of the
administration of an estate, it can only be accomplished after
appointment of a personal representative which is necessary to
commence administration. 55 Any attempt to sell property during
the three year period following death on the basis of an informally
probated will without an appointment would most likely be futile
because of the priority of the widow's elective share and of
creditors' claims. Furthermore, purchasers for value are protected
51 Note 17 supra.
52 U.P.C. § 3-305.
53 U.P.C. § 3-705. U.P.C. § 3-301 provides that any application for informal probate
include the names and addresses of heirs and devisees so far as known or ascertain-
able with reasonable diligence by the applicant. Those heirs and devisees whose
addresses were made available to the personal representative by their being listed on
the application for informal probate would be the very same as those who would
receive notice pursuant to U.P.C. § 3-403 prior to formal proceedings.
54 U.P.C. § 2-201 gives a surviving spouse a right of election to take an elective share of
the estate. § 2-205 establishes the time limit for electing the elective share at six
months after publication of notice to creditors. U.P.C. § 3-803 provides that credi-
tors' claims are not barred against a decedent's estate until four months after publica-
tion of notice, or, if notice to creditors has not been published, claims are not barred
until three years after decedent's death.
55 U.P.C. § 3-103.
[Vol. 3:1I
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only if they purchase from a personal representative56 or from a
distributee possessed of property received from a personal repre-
sentative. 57 After a three year period, however, no personal rep-
resentative can be appointed. Consequently the right to claim an
elective share, which must be done through a personal representa-
tive, would appear to be barred after that time, although the Code
is not clear on this point. The Code is clear, however, in provid-
ing that, absent the appointment of a personal representative, the
three year limitation does not bar the claims to homestead allow-
ance 58 and exempt property. 59 As a result, without the appoint-
ment, purchasers for value are unprotected and would be liable
for any property claimed by the spouse as a homestead allowance
or as exempt property, even after three years. Furthermore, al-
though a will is conclusive after three years, it is always subject to
interpretation if there has been no personal representative ap-
pointed to make distribution.
Finally, protection against deliberate misrepresentation in an
attempt to disinherit a rightful heir is provided by allowing dam-
ages or any other appropriate relief in an action against the
perpetrator of the fraud commenced within two years from the
discovery of the fraud or an action for restitution from any person
benefitting from the fraud other than a bona fide purchaser.60 In
addition, there is a possibility of an action for perjury. 61
Although there remains a possibility that a true heir may be
disinherited in spite of the above precautions, the probability of
such is more than tolerable when balanced against the overall
fairness and efficiency of the informal procedures. However, the
possibility of disinheritance inherent in informal probate requires
56 U.P.C. § 3-714.
57 U.P.C. § 3-910.
5 8 Note 41 supra.
59 Note 42 supra,6 0 U.P.C. § 1-106.
61 Forcing one who seeks informal probate or informal appointment to make oath before a
public official concerning the details required of applications should deter persons
who might otherwise misuse the no-notice feature of informal proceedings. The
application is available as a part of the public record. If deliberately false representa-
tion is made, remedies for fraud will be available to injured persons without specified
time limit. The section is believed to provide important safeguards that may extend
well beyond those presently available under supervised administration for persons
damaged by deliberate wrongdoing. U.P.C. § 3-301, Comment.
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an evaluation of the no-notice provisions in terms of con-
stitutional due process.
IV. Informal Proceedings: Mullane and Due Process
A. The Mullane Decision
In 1959 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co.6 2 The basic question was whether
published notice of a final judicial settlement of accounts in a
common trust fund provided beneficiaries with due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although notice by publica-
tion was found sufficient for beneficiaries whose whereabouts
were unknown and for ". . . those beneficiaries whose interests
are either conjectural or future, ... ,"63 the Court held that
"... known present beneficiaries of known place of resi-
dence.. ." were entitled to be informed of the proceedings at
least by ordinary mail. 64 Justice Jackson, speaking for the major-
ity, wrote:
An elementary and fundamental requirement
of due process in any proceeding which is to
be accorded finality is notice reasonably cal-
culated, under all the circumstances, to ap-
prise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.65
No explicit standard of reasonableness was enunciated; there is
no absolute test of due process which may be rigidly applied to all
proceedings. 66 Rather, a determination of whether or not due
process is satisfied must depend on the circumstances and facts of
each case. "The reasonableness and hence the constitutional va-
lidity of any chosen method [of notice] may be defended on the
ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those
affected .... 67 This interpretation is entirely consistent with the
62 339 U.S. 306, (1950).
63 339 U.S. at 317.
64 339 U.S. at 318.
6 339 U.S. at 314.
66 "The Court has not committed itself to any formula ... determining when constructive
notice may be utilized, or what test it must meet." 339 U.S. at 314.
67 339 U.S. at 315.
[Vol. 3:1i
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Court's policy first enunciated in 1877 by Mr. Justice Miller when
he said:
[T]here is wisdom, we think, in the ascertain-
ing of the intent and application of [the due
process clause] by the gradual process of ju-
dicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases
presented for decision require. 68
The question is thus raised whether the general notice require-
ments enunciated in Mullane are applicable to probate proceed-
ings, 69 and if so, whether the informal probate procedures of the
Uniform Probate Code adequately conform to those require-
ments.
B. Applicability of Mullane to Probate Proceedings
The Court in Mullane indicated that the new standard of notice
was perhaps applicable to certain fields of law where published
notice had previously been considered adequate. 70 The opinion of
the Court makes it quite clear, however, that the holding of
18 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877). See also: Hager v. Reclamation
Dist. Ill U.S. 701 (1884); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 at 100 (1908);
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S.
233 at 246, 247 (1943); Rosenberg v. Flenti, 374 U.S. 449 U.S. 449 at 462 (1962).
69 The Supreme Court has subsequently applied the Mullane standard to bankruptcy, City
of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 203 (1953); condemnation,
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112 (1956); and tax lien foreclosure proceedings, Covey v. Town of
Sommers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956). However, state courts in Washington have ruled
Mullane inapplicable to probate procedures in that state; New York Merchandise Co.
v. Stout, 43 Wash.2d 825, 264 P.2d 863 (1953) and In The Matter of The Estate of
Shew 296 P.2d 667, 48 Wash.2d 732 (1956). But see Comment, Adequacy of
Process, 32 WASH. L. REV. 165, 178-79 (1957).
70 It is not readily apparent how the courts of New York did or would
classify the present proceeding, which has some charac-
teristics and is wanting in some features of proceedings
both in rem and in personam. But in any event we think
that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classifica-
tion for which the standards are so elusive and confused
generally and which, being primarily for state courts to
define, may and do vary from state to state. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 312.
See also Note, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Pro-
ceedings, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1257 (1957).
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Mullane is not as far-reaching as it may at first appear. Speaking
of the balance sought between the interests of the State and those
of the individual which are protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 7 1 Justice Jackson stated:
The Court has not committed itself to any
formula achieving a balance between these
interests in a particular proceeding or deter-
mining when constructive notice may be uti-
lized or what test it must meet. Personal ser-
vice has not in all circumstances been re-
garded as indispensable to the process due to
residents, and it has more often been held
unnecessary as to nonresidents. We disturb
none of the established rules on these sub-
jects. [Emphasis added.] 72
Consequently, before any determination of whether the Code's
procedures are consistent with the Mullane requirements, it
should be determined whether the Code's informal procedures
consist of the "established rules on these subjects" which the
Court intended to leave undisturbed by its decision.
73
The most obvious category of old "established rules" are those
rules relevant to a "subject" which have been repeatedly enun-
ciated by the Court in its earlier decisions. Moreover, situations
where age-old procedures have been sanctioned by a substantial
number of state courts,7 4 although not binding on the Supreme
Court, would probably influence its thinking with respect to what
is and is not due process.
The informal and formal procedures of the Code closely paral-
lel the common form and solemn form methods 75 of proving wills
71 Against this interest of the State [in bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a final
settlement] we must balance the individual interest sought to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. This is defined by our holding that '[tihe fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' 339 U.S. at 314.
72 339 U.S. at 314.
7a See Perry, The Mullane Doctrine -A Reappraisal of Statutory Notice Requirements,
1952 CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION, 32, 47 et seq.
74See Simes, The A dministration of a Decedent's Estate as A Proceeding In Rem, 43
MICH. L. REV. 675, N. 69 (1945), fora list of early state cases holding common form
probate without notice fully consistent with due process.
75 See 2 J. WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, §§ 216, 217 (3rd ed. 1923),
T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS § 93 at 482, (2d ed. 1953) and U.P.C. § 3-303,
Comment.
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in the English ecclesiastical courts. 76 An executor wishing to
prove a will in common form simply produced it and proved its
execution by his own oath. 77 As with the informal procedures of
the Code, no notice had to be given to any party. However, a will
proved in common form could, within a certain period of time, be
proved again in solemn form in which case interested parties,
such as those who would take in intestacy, were given notice and
allowed to contest the will in a final judicial proceeding. 78
These procedures were carried over to the American Colonies
and formed the core of American probate law. 79 Many states
have retained no-notice probate procedures and several refer to
these procedures as "common form" probate. 80 Other states have
76 For a discussion of the English traditions in general, see Simes and Basye, The Organi-
zation of the Probate Court in America; 42 MICH. L. REV. 965, 43 MICH. L. REV.
113 (1944); Comment, 50 MICH. L. REV. 124, 129-132 (1951).
77 You shall swear that you believe this to be the last will and testament of
the deceased, and that you will pay all the debts and
legacies of the deceased, so far as the goods will extend,
and the law shall bind you; and that you will cause all the
said goods to be apprized, and make a true and perfect
inventory of the said goods, (at a day appointed by the
judge, if none be then exhibited) and likewise a true and
just account of the said goods, when you shall be thereto
lawfully called. So help you God. H. CONSET, PRACTICE
OF THE SPIRITUAL OR ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS 12 (3rd
ed. 1708).
78 See note 75, supra.79See Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: 1, 42 MICH. L.
REV. 965, 977 et seq. (1944). See also A. REPPY & L. TOMPKINS, HISTORY OF WILLS,
159 et seq. (1928).
80See for example, Miss. CODE ANN. § 496 (1942), the judicial decisions supplementing
this section all refer to the procedures as probate of a will in common form. Kelley v.
Davis, 37 M. 76 (1859), Murray v. Murphy, 39 M. 214 (1860). MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 496 (1968 Supp.), Perry v. Aldrich, 251 M. 429, 169 So.2d 786 (1964). DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12 § 1304 (1953), "Proof of a will may be taken without notice to persons
interested unless a party requests it." GA. CODE ANN. § 113-601 (1959); "Probate of
a will may be either in common or solemn form."N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 550:4 :1
(1955), "The judge may, at discretion, proceed without notice ... in the probate of
wills in common form." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 3 1-12: (1966 Replacement Vol.). Refer-
ence decisions under this section refer to proceedings as probate in common form; In
re Rowland, 202 N.C. 373, 162 S.E. 897 (1932); Wells v. Odum, 205 N.C. 110, 170
S.E. 145 (1933); Will.of Etheridge, 231 N.C. 502, 57 S.E.2d 768 (1950). TENN.
CODE ANN. § 32-204 (1955), See Notes to Decisions 2, "Written wills may be
admitted to probate in common form upon the evidence of one witness, and such
probate is almost a matter of course." Townsend v. Bonner, I Shannon's Cases 197
(1869); Fielder v. Pemberton, 136 Tenn. 440, 189 S.W. 873 (1916). S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 19-252-253 (1962).
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made various changes in the procedure such as requiring some
form of notice before proving a will whether it be mailed notice,
notice by publication, or notice at the discretion of the judge."'
These traditional probate proceedings, which trace their begin-
nings to the ecclesiastical courts of England, and which have been
held on several occasions to be consistent with due process re-
quirements,8 2 clearly constitute "established rules" left undis-
turbed by the Mullane decision.
The hesitancy of the Court to employ the due process clause as
a-means of revising traditional state practices is well illustrated in
Ownbey v. Morgan where the Court stated:
The due process clause does not impose upon
the states a duty to establish ideal systems for
the administration of justice, with every mod-
ern improvement and with provision against
every possible hardship... A procedure cus-
tomarily employed, long before the Revolu-
tion, in the commercial metropolis of Eng-
land, and generally adopted by the States as
suited to their circumstances and needs, can-
not be deemed inconsistent with due process
of law.. 83
This description of the due process clause has been affirmed
several times by the Supreme Court.
8 4
61 For examples of statutes requiring mailed notice, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 63, 64
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. §§ 525.24, .83 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 136.110 (1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 25 (1969 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-3-5 (1953). For examples of statues requiring less than mailed notice, see
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 317-12 (1955) (published notice only); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 102, 201 (1965) (notice by publication or personal service as directed by
the Court); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 107 (1959) (published notice only). For exam-
ples of statutes which, as in the U.P.C., require some form of notice upon the
appointment of a personal representative, see ARK. STAT. ANN §§ 62-2012, 2110,
2111 (Supp. 1967) (notice mailed to, or personally served upon known heirs and
devisees); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 7-105, 107 (Supp. 1969) (notice by ordinary mail to
heirs and devisees whose addresses appear in the application for probate); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 473.017 (Supp. 1969), 473.033 (1959) (notice by ordinary mail to heirs and
devisees whose addresses appear in the application for probate.)
82 See note 74 supra.
8a 256 U.S. 94 at 110, 111 (1920).84 See for example, Jackman v. Rosenbaum Company, 260 U.S. 22 (1922) at 31; The Corn
Exchange Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218 (1930) at 223; Greenough Trustees v. Tax
Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 at 499 (1947). (Frankfurter in a concurring
opinion); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 at 370 (1959). See also Comment,
Probate Proceedings-Administration of Decedents' Estates- The Mullane Case and
Due Process of Law, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 124, 129 et seq. (1951).
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There is little authority dealing specifically with the validity of
common form probate notice requirements in terms of due pro-
cess. Indeed, these notice requirements have never been seriously
challenged. However, some early authority can be found which
indicates the Court's acceptance of the no-notice, common form
probate proceedings as fully consistent with due process of law.85
In any event, it is clear that the due process clause is rarely used
as a means of revising state procedures which have been prac-
ticed since the Revolution in order that they continue to adjust to
ever-changing standards of "reasonableness.' '86
C. Informal Proceedings and the Mullane Requirements:
Is Due Process Afforded?
Assuming, however, that the Mullane standards could hurdle
the "established practice" restriction placed on due process deci-
sions and were applicable to probate proceedings, the Code's
procedures would nonetheless accord with the demands of that
decision. The Court clearly restricted its formulation of adequate
notice to proceedings which are to be accorded finality. 87 Under
the Code, only formal proceedings, preceded by adequate notice,
85 In Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89 (1905), the heir at law of a decedent challenged the
probate of a will, alleging that notice was not given them as required by state statute.
The Court said:
... [D]espite the mere preliminary admission to pro-
bate, there was full right to assail the existence of the will
(within one year) and its probate, which was not lost by
failure to give notice.... Indeed, the contention made on
this subject amounts to asserting that every state law
which provides for a probate in common form is repug-
nant to the due process clause of the Constitution, even
although ... interested parties may subsequently, within
a time fixed by law, be heard in the probate proceedings
to question the existence of a will or its probate. When
the result of the proposition is thus ascertained it be-
comes obvious that it is ... so in conflict with the adjudi-
cations of this court... that it is devoid of all foundation
in reason.... 199 U.S. at 118.
See also, Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608, 611 (1883).
8 See Comment, 50 MICH. L. REV. supra note 84, at 132 (1951).
87 An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions. 339 U.S. 306 at 314 (1950). [Emphasis added].
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are to be accorded finality, a8 while informal proceedings are open
to attack at any time within a period of three years from the death
of the decedent. During this period any interested party may
petition for a formal proceeding which immediately supercedes
the non-judicial informal probate.8 9
The Supreme Court of Iowa held that Mullane did not require
mailed notice of a hearing to admit a will to probate, reasoning
that since the probate order allowed for an original action to be
brought to set aside the will within two years after notice of
admission, the order was not final.9 0 Nor is this reasoning in-
validated by the Supreme Court's decision in Schroeder v. City of
New York,9 1 which held that published and posted notice of a
condemnation proceeding was insufficient, even though there was
a three year statute of limitations for filing claims against the City.
In Schroeder, the length of time allowed to present a claim was
irrelevant, for the nature of the action taken by the city was not
such as would be likely in itself to inform an affected party that
his property was being taken. 9 2
Probate procedures do not encounter this communication
difficulty. Notice of death generally travels fast, especially to
heirs at law. This type of notice, which implies to the recipient
that probate proceedings are likely to be pending, has been de-
pended upon in common form probate and has been found satis-
factory by state courts. 93 Accordingly, the three year period
allowed by the Code in which any interested person may initiate
formal proceedings or contest a will would seem to be more than
ample time for the natural notice of death to reach heirs at law
and to warn them of possible probate proceedings.
88 U.P.C. § 3-403.
89 Note 26, supra and accompanying text.
90 In Re Pierce's Estate, 245 Ia. 22, 60 N.W.2d 894, 897 (1953).
91371 U.S. 208 (1962).
92 The city was diverting a portion of a river 25 miles above appellant's property which
consisted of a house and three and one-half acres of land situated on the bank of the
river. The proceedings to divert the river were begun by the city in 1952. Appellant
complained, however, that she knew nothing about the condemnation proceedings nor
of her right to make a claim against the city until after she had consulted a lawyer in
1959. 371 U.S. at 210, 211 (1962).
93 See for example, Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 330, 333-334 (1859); Knight v.
Hollings, 73 N.H. 495, 500 (1906).
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Mullane makes it clear that the issue of adequate notice de-
pends upon the reasonableness of the notice rather than upon any
rigid statutory formula or requirement. 94 Certainly the fact that
probate procedures follow from a person's death, with the natural
notice afforded thereby, distinguishes these procedures from the
other areas of in rem litigation where natural notice is generally
lacking. The notice afforded by death seems "reasonably calcu-
lated, under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action," 95 and the three year challenge period
is adequate time to "afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." 96
Moreover, all interested persons, including those who appear to
be disinherited by the assumption concerning testacy, are re-
quired to be informed of the appointment of a personal represen-
tative regardless of whether the appointment is made in formal or
informal procedures. 97 Consequently the Code's informal proce-
dures would appear to provide greater protection for the heirs at
law than those states which presently provide for no-notice com-
mon form probate.
Furthermore, Schroeder involved the physical alteration of
land. When such alteration has taken place and restoration is
impossible or highly impractical, the injured party's only alterna-
tive is to seek compensatory damages. Therefore the party whose
land is being affected should be informed of the condemnation in
order to contest the action and protect the property rather than
having to settle for money damages. Probate proceedings, on the
other hand, frequently involve the transfer of real property to
devisees without liquidation. Under the Code, unless the property
has been sold to a bona fide purchaser for value before the will is
challenged, a disinherited heir would receive fully adequate relief
through recovery of the same property originally devised. 98 If the
property in question has been sold, the purchaser is protected
only if he bought from the personal representative or from a
94 See note 66 supra, and accompanying text.
9' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 314.
96 339 U.S. at 314.
17 Text accompanying note 24 supra.
98 U.P.C. § 3-909 and Comment.
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distributee after distribution by a personal representative 9 in
which case information of proceedings would have previously
been given to all interested persons. 100 If the purchaser is pro-
tected, however, the distributee is liable for the value as of the
date of disposition of the property improperly received and its
income and gain received by him. 10 1
It is also significant that the Mullane decision and subsequent
decisions extending the Mullane doctrine102 apply the rigid notice
requirements only to known present beneficiaries. The court
stated in Mullane: "As to known present beneficiaries of known
places of residence ... the reasons disappear for resort to means
less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency."103 Any
heirs at law, however, not mentioned in a decedent's testament
would more likely be "beneficiaries whose interests are either
conjectural or future" 10 4 rather than present beneficiaries and
would consequently not be entitled to Mullane notice. The inter-
ests of heirs at law disinherited by a decedent's will are contin-
gent upon successful contest of the will 10 5 and are therefore not
vested as were the interests of the beneficiary in Mullane and
those interested parties in cases where the Mullane standards
have been extended. 10 6
V. Conclusion
The Uniform Probate Code offers the individual seeking pro-
bate of a will an array of alternative methods which allow him to
dispose of the matter in an efficient and timely manner. The Code
permits an individual to make his own decision in this matter
while offering him as much protection, through a combination of
formal and informal procedures, as he deems necessary and desir-
able. The provisions calling for a detailed sworn application, a
statutory check by the registrar of all wills informally offered for
99 Notes 56 and 57, supra, and accompanying text.
100 See text accompanying note 24, supra.
101 U.P.C. § 3-909.
1
0 2 See note 69, supra.
103 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 318.
104 339 U.S. at 317.
105 In Re Pierce's Estate, 245 Ia. 22, 60 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1953).
106 Note 69, supra.
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probate and the generous three year period in which a will may be
contested assures that the no-notice characteristic of informal
probate will not work substantial injustice. Additional protection
is supplied by the requirement that all interested persons be
informed by ordinary mail of the appointment of a personal repre-
sentative. The injustice of unnecessary delay too often occasion-
ed by present probate proceedings, coupled with the fact that the
great majority of wills are uncontested, 10 7 point out the need for
reorganization of American probate law. The flexible response of
the Uniform Probate Code offers an efficient, expeditious method
of settling estates while maintaining that fairness commensurate
with the Supreme Court's due process standards. It serves as an
excellent guide for state lesiglatures in their efforts to reform
probate law and procedures.
107 See Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death,
30 CHI. L. REV. 241 (1963). A study made by Professor Dunham in Cook County
revealed "that 85 percent of the deaths in the sample resulted in no probate proceed-
ings," at 244. See also, Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in
America; 11, 43 MICH. L. REV. 113, 114 (1944), where the authors state: "No
statistics are required to justify the observation that the vast majority of smaller
estates is handled by American probate courts without any controversies whatever."
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